Key Points

• Yemen is at a crossroads between permanent settlement and continued instability. Although the ceasefire agreed upon in 2022 has persisted beyond its expiry, economic and geopolitical developments have made renewed instability in the country highly likely.
• Different outcomes being considered include: a federal state structure, two separate states, or a prolonged status quo with fragmented governance. The Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) exists only due to Saudi backing. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) continues to push for secession, complicating efforts to reach a unified settlement. Meanwhile, Ansar Allah has consolidated control in the North, strengthening their position for negotiations.
• Both Ansar Allah and the STC continue to exercise authoritarian control over their territories. As evidenced by the death of an aid worker in Ansar Allah's captivity in January 2025, the country remains dangerous to operate, and foreign entities are likely to be targeted.
• Renewed sanctions targeting Ansar Allah, including the recent re-designation of the group as a terrorist entity, will severely restrict the ability of aid groups and companies to operate without falling foul of Washington. Many entities, including aid groups, charities and companies, may find the country, especially the areas under Ansar Allah's control, to be too dangerous to operate.
• The regions of Hodeida and Marib remain the most likely flashpoints in the country. Both regions are economically and strategically vital and are home to large numbers of displaced people. Renewed instability will almost certainly result in severe degradation of local economies, and can result in renewed movements of displaced Yemenis that will put socioeconomic pressure elsewhere. 
• Saudi Arabia and Israel are very likely capable of deterring Ansar Allah rocket and drone attacks and are presumed to recover quickly from any damage. However, sustained attacks may still impact their economies and their international prestige.
• Internationally, Ansar Allah is very likely to launch renewed attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes. These attacks are prone to be deterred by U.S. and U.K. ships present in the region. However, many shipping companies will likely avoid the region preemptively, or enter into clandestine agreements with Ansar Allah to ensure the safe passage of their vessels. Regardless, the situation will make shipping routes via the Red Sea less appealing, impacting the Egyptian economy due to revenue losses from the Suez Canal, and impacting European economies due to supply chain issues.
• Entities operating in Yemen should be prepared for instability and clashes, especially in the regions of Hodeida and Marib. Those operating outside immediate conflict zones, especially those operating in IRG or STC controlled areas may continue to find space to operate. However, they will presumably still feel the effects of instability, especially if the country sees continued internal displacement.
• Entities operating in Egypt or Europe should also prepare for price fluctuations and supply-chain disruptions.

Summary

Background

Yemen has a rich history dating back thousands of years. The modern Yemeni state emerged in 1990 through the unification of North and South Yemen. The North-South divide persisted, the two regions have distinct historical, political, and religious characteristics. The North, more mountainous and populous, was predominantly Shia and was under Ottoman rule, while the Sunni-majority South was a British colony. However, sectarianism has not been a major driver of the current conflict. Unification soon led to tensions as Southern leaders felt marginalized, and in 1994, a brief civil war erupted when the South attempted to secede. The Northern-led Republic of Yemen, under President Ali Abdullah Saleh, crushed the rebellion, further consolidating power. Over the following years, Saleh ruled through patronage networks, exploiting tribal divisions and maintaining a fragile balance between competing factions.

In the early 2000s, tensions escalated with the rise of Ansar Allah, commonly known as the Houthis, in the North, a Zaidi Shia group opposed to Saleh’s policies and perceived Saudi influence. Between 2004 and 2010, the government fought several wars against Ansar Allah, failing to defeat them, yet resulting in the death of the leader of the movement, Hussein al Houthi, brother to the current leader Abdul Malik Al Houthi. Simultaneously, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) expanded its presence, taking advantage of Yemen’s weak governance. The 2011 Arab Spring protests further destabilized Yemen, leading to mass demonstrations that forced Saleh to resign in 2012, transferring power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. However, Hadi struggled to govern, facing economic decline, continued Ansar Allah resistance, and growing discontent in the South. By 2014, Ansar Allah, backed by elements of Saleh’s forces, seized the capital, Sana’a, forcing Hadi to flee. In 2015, a Saudi-led coalition intervened militarily to restore his government, marking the beginning of the current conflict. The war has since devolved into a complex crisis involving regional powers, tribal militias, Southern secessionists, and extremist groups, with devastating humanitarian consequences.

Figure 1: Yemen Zones of Control from April to June 2024

Ongoing Developments

The UN-led peace process has made progress but remains fragile. A nationwide agreement, brokered in April 2022, significantly reduced violence and allowed for limited humanitarian access. While the truce officially expired in October 2022, both sides largely upheld its terms, preventing a return to full-scale war. This period saw intensified Saudi-Ansar Allah backchannel talks, facilitated by Oman, aimed at a broader settlement. However, progress stalled over unresolved issues, including revenue sharing, security arrangements, and salary payments for public sector workers in Ansar Allah-controlled areas. The truce was supposed to be extended, but negotiations failed due to these sticking points. Since the end of the formal truce, Yemen has entered a "no war, no peace" grey zone characterized by economic warfare. Ansar Allah has targeted oil facilities and economic infrastructure in Shabwa and Hadramawt, aiming to cripple government revenues by limiting oil exports. These attacks have exacerbated the economic crisis in government-controlled areas.

Recent developments suggest Yemen is at a crossroads between a permanent settlement and continued instability. There are different outcomes to be considered: a federal state structure, two separate states, or a prolonged status quo with fragmented governance. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) continues to push for secession, complicating efforts to reach a unified settlement. Meanwhile, Ansar Allah has consolidated control in the North, strengthening their position for negotiations.

Ansar Allah has imposed severe restrictions on women’s movement through the “mahram” system, requiring them to travel with a male guardian. The restrictions have impacted female national staff working in organizations that travel for work or organize aid deliveries. Consequently, many women have been forced to resign from their positions in local and international organizations. In the South, the STC has cracked down on civil society organizations, restricting civic space. Despite there being no official prohibitions on the right of women to travel in Yemen, women have faced restrictions and harassment at STC checkpoints under the guise of security measures. Additionally, Ansar Allah has detained dozens of aid workers, diplomats, and civil society members, with some remaining in detention six months after their arrests. One of the UN staff members detained on January 23, 2004,  has since died in detention, causing the UN to temporarily suspend all UN operations in the Saada governorate. UN operations have since resumed.

Red Sea Escalation & International Response

The Red Sea has become a major flashpoint, with Ansar Allah intensifying its maritime attacks. They have hijacked commercial vessels and launched missile and drone strikes on Israel and foreign targets, framing their actions as solidarity with Gaza. Their direct missile and drone strikes on Israel marked a rare escalation, raising regional concerns. In response, the U.S. and U.K. have carried out multiple strikes on Ansar Allah missile sites, radar installations, and weapons depots. These strikes, primarily in Sana’a, Hodeida, and Saada, aim to curb Ansar Allah's long-range strike capabilities and deter further maritime threats. However, they also risk deepening Yemen’s isolation and further entrenching Ansar Allah’s hostility toward Western actors.

Figure 2: U.S.-U.K. Strikes in Houthi-Controlled Territories from April to June 2024

Despite Yemen’s relative isolation, these attacks had immense impacts on the world economy. It is estimated that between November 2023 and November 2024, the Suez Canal recorded a 72% decline in ships passing through, resulting in severe revenue losses for the Egyptian Government. As a result of the delays, as well as the increased risk, the costs of shipping and insurance both rose significantly. The effects were particularly severe on Europe, which experienced major inflation and energy price fluctuations, contributing to the ongoing cost of living crisis. Despite the uninterrupted presence of U.S. and U.K. vessels, sporadic attacks by the Ansar Allah continued. The group only announced an end to its attacks on non-Israeli ships following the agreement of a ceasefire in Gaza.

Regional Dynamics 

Saudi Arabia, with its Saudi-led coalition (SLC) has, since 2015, aimed to restore the internationally recognized government and curb Ansar Allah's influence. Saudi concerns about Ansar Allah's alignment with Iran and their proximity to the southern border have driven military involvement. After years of military stalemate, a tarnished human rights record and mounting costs, Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought a diplomatic resolution, including direct negotiations with Ansar Allah. These talks, aided by Oman, have led to intermittent de-escalation but remain fragile.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has pursued its own agenda, particularly in southern Yemen. Although initially part of the SLC, the UAE has largely scaled back its direct military involvement. The UAE now provides significant support to the STC and its secessionist aspirations. Additionally, the UAE has backed forces like Abu Zara’a al-Muharrami and his Salafist militia the Southern Giants Brigades, enhancing its influence through local militias and control over strategic ports like Aden and Mukalla.

Iran backs Ansar Allah, providing significant military support, including weapons, training, and technology. Tehran's involvement aligns with its broader strategy to counter Saudi influence and extend its regional power. This support has strengthened Ansar Allah to maintain resistance against the SLC and control the most populous territories of Yemen. However, Ansar Allah has exhibited a degree of independence, making decisions based on their own political and military interests, rather than strictly following Iranian directives. This has differentiated Ansar Allah from other Iranian-backed proxy groups in the region.

Oman has played a neutral role, acting as a key mediator in the conflict. It has facilitated peace talks, particularly the recent UN-led truce, and maintained communication with both Ansar Allah and the SLC, positioning itself as a vital diplomatic actor. Oman's efforts have been essential in preserving the fragile truce and fostering potential negotiations.

Economic Dynamics 

The Yemeni economy was already strained and vulnerable even prior to the eruption of the conflict in 2015. In 2011, the country ranked 154^th on the Human Development Index, 138^th on extreme poverty ranking, 147^th on life expectancy, and 172^nd on educational attainment. The country was listed in the World Bank’s low-middle-income category and did not achieve any of its Millennium Development Goals.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that the conflict, which killed around 250,000 people so far due to direct and indirect causes, has eroded the livelihoods of over 54% of the population. The conflict had severe impacts on water, sanitation, education, health, telecoms, and transportation. The emergence of rival and competing power centres led to the emergence of fragmented institutions and inconsistent monetary, fiscal and economic policies that led to a rise of unregulated financial businesses, resulting in costly distortions within the economy.

As of the closing months of 2024, Yemen’s economic crisis remains dire. Although the UN-sponsored truce in October 2022 offered some hope for improvement, the escalation of the conflict in Gaza and Ansar Allah's involvement in the conflict persists to have significant negative effects, resulting in sustained socio-economic deterioration, increased displacement, and worsening infrastructure. The World Bank estimated that Yemeni GDP shrank by 1% in 2024, following a 2% decrease in 2023. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) anticipates further GDP decline in 2025. As a result of the crisis, Yemen’s Internationally-Recognised Government (IRG) has been unable to pay employee salaries for several months. Currently, the IRG remains afloat due to a $500 million economic support package agreed with Saudi Arabia. However, the aid package has, so far, failed to stem the deteriorating currency and conditions. In February 2025, protests took place in areas under the control of the IRG and the STC in response to country-wide blackouts, deteriorating conditions, and depreciating currency. Demonstrations of a similar nature were also reported in the Ansar Allah-held capital of Sana’a, showcasing the country-wide deterioration.

As a result of the severe state of poverty and economic collapse in the country, much of the country’s populace is reliant on foreign aid. According to the UN in Yemen, as many as 19.5 million people – out of a population of around 30 million – require aid, necessitating some $2.47 billion.

Figure 3: Intersectorial pin and targeted map

Between 50% and 70% of Yemen’s population, and a majority of aid recipients, are located in western Yemen, living predominantly in Ansar Allah-controlled areas, outside the reach or authority of Yemen’s IRG. This leaves them particularly vulnerable to geopolitical shifts, and the whims of warring factions. This was particularly demonstrated in the port of Hodeida during the height of the conflict. Before the war, Yemen imported 90% of its food supply, 70% of which entered through Hodeida. The eruption of the conflict and the resulting damage to and around the port severely restricted the import intake, forcing ships to wait for weeks at times. In addition to the conflict, the Saudi blockade on the Ansar Allah-held port often forced ships to reroute, further restricting imports and slowing the transfer of vital goods. Due to these activities,  food prices rose severely, resulting in widespread malnutrition and cases of famine. With the easing of the blockade on Yemen, the ceasefire agreement between the IRG and the Ansar Allah, and the downgrading of the Ansar Allah terrorist designation under the Biden Administration in the U.S., the port of Hodeida once again became the focal point of aid efforts into Yemen, with some 80% of aid entering through the port. However, delays are common due to the damage to the local infrastructure, and bureaucratic hurdles, highlighting the fragility of the conditions on the ground.

Amidst this trend of fragility, the prospect of resumed conflict looms large in Yemen.

Despite the relative success of the ceasefire since 2022, there are signs that the country may face renewed conflict. In recent weeks, IRG-linked media accused the Ansar Allah of escalation in the Marib Province, a region that witnessed some of the heaviest fighting between the warring factions. The Ansar Allah were accused of mobilizing their forces, reinforcing their positions, and increasing the number of drone attacks in the region. 

Another potential source of conflict lies between the Ansar Allah and Israel within the context of the conflict in Gaza. In the aftermath of the Israel-Hamas conflict, Ansar Allah voiced their support for Hamas and Iran. As part of the ‘Axis of Resistance’, the Yemeni group attacked Red Sea shipping lanes to ostensibly target businesses operating in Israel. Ansar Allah has also launched numerous drone attacks towards Israel itself. The latter, in turn, has conducted numerous airstrikes on Ansar Allah sites, including at the port of Hodeida. Although the Ansar Allah movement made several de-escalatory gestures in the aftermath of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, they have also expressed readiness to re-escalate in the event of resumed conflict in Gaza. With the Trump administration also promising to up the pressure on Iran and its allies in support of Israel, there is a significant likelihood of escalation in the region.

In this context, even non-conflict developments stand to have significant impacts on the country’s economy. In particular, one of the first actions of the Trump Administration was the re-designation of the Ansar Allah movement as a terrorist group, requiring the USAID to cut ties with entities working with Ansar Allah. The increased scrutiny that aid groups operating in Yemen will face from the U.S. is likely to create a highly restrictive environment, severely limiting the flow of aid and trade into the Ansar Allah-controlled areas of Yemen. As such, even a scenario in which open conflict does not erupt still carries with it the risk of severe economic and humanitarian impacts. 

As a result, there are several domestic and international risk factors facing the Yemeni economy.

Domestic Economic Dynamics

Given Yemen’s existing domestic instability factors, any development that exacerbates the structural economic weaknesses, ongoing governance struggles, and persistent impacts of the war is highly likely to cause numerous detrimental knock-on effects on the country’s domestic and humanitarian situation.

This is particularly evident in aid. With such a significant portion of the Yemeni population in need of aid living in Ansar Allah-controlled parts of the country, any developments – be they political or military – will have near-immediate effects on the civilian populations living in these areas.

The exact scale of impact is difficult to calculate. At a rough estimate, the humanitarian assistance budget for Yemen averages around $2 billion annually, with $1.5 billion going to Ansar Allah-controlled areas. Not all of this aid reaches the needy, with the Ansar Allah frequently accused of redirecting aid for their purposes and implementing systems to ensure such. As such, there is a question on whether the suspension of aid – either due to conflict or sanctions – would pressure the Ansar Allah’s coffers more than the Yemeni economy. However, given that the previous round of escalation already resulted in severe famine and shortages across the country, such an outcome repeating is very highly likely.

In such a scenario, Yemen will almost certainly see skyrocketing food and commodity prices, putting them beyond the reach of ordinary Yemenis. The country will likely see renewed movements of displaced individuals to areas that can still receive aid, such as areas under IRG control, putting strain on the economy of these areas.

Yemen’s agricultural output is unlikely to match the demand. Although agriculture makes up a significant portion of Yemeni GDP at about 15%, the sector is highly vulnerable to soil erosion, water scarcity and other effects of climate change. The conflict has exacerbated the situation, with the SLC accused of targeting farmland in Ansar Allah-controlled areas. Overall, the conflict resulted in severe decline of agricultural potential in the countryside surrounding Hodeida which is typically considered one of the country’s main ‘breadbasket’ regions. Increased pressure on agricultural capacities due to famine, and the impacts of war, will very likely continue this trend of decline. To stem financial ruin, local farmers may turn towards growing substances such as khat, a stimulant popular in the region. This, in turn, is likely to worsen food insecurity, drive food prices up higher, and stoke criminality.

The hydrocarbons sector is another area that is likely to be impacted. Oil and gas are the main source of revenue for the Yemeni Government, accounting for some 70% of revenues before the war. The country’s main oil fields are located in Shabwa and Marib provinces and are under the control of the IRG. As such, it is highly unlikely that a change in the sanctions regime targeting the Ansar Allah will impact the oil and gas trade.

However, the Ansar Allah have been known to target oil installations and other critical infrastructure on grounds of the SLC ‘plundering’ the country’s sovereign wealth. It is estimated Yemen lost $1 billion in revenues due to the cessation of oil exports, forcing the IRG to rely heavily on Saudi Arabia. With Marib emerging as the most likely flashpoint for renewed armed clashes, it is highly likely that the country’s hydrocarbons industry will witness further decline.

International Economic Dynamics

The limited capacity and global integration of the Yemeni economy means that its collapse has not resulted in significant contamination in neighbouring economies. However, the conflict nevertheless threatens the international economy in unique ways.

Chief among these is Yemen’s geographic location: Located at the narrow mouth of the Red Sea known as the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, Yemen, alongside Eritrea and Djibouti, serves as the gateway into the ports of Eliat and Aqaba in Israel and Jordan, as well as the Suez Canal in Egypt. With the Red Sea facilitating some 15% of all global maritime trade and 30% of all container traffic, Yemen’s location gives the country immense geostrategic and geoeconomic leverage.

Figure 4: Confirmed Houthi Attacks on Commercial Shipping from April to June 2024

The attacks by Ansar Allah on the Red Sea routes had immense impacts on the world economy. It is estimated that between November 2023 and November 2024, the Suez Canal recorded a 72% decline in ships passing through, resulting in severe revenue losses for the Egyptian Government. As a result of the delays, as well as the increased risk, the costs of shipping and insurance both rose significantly. The effects were particularly severe on Europe which experienced major inflation and energy price fluctuations, contributing to the ongoing cost of living crisis. Although a coalition of U.S. and U.K. warships were able to repel many of the attacks since being deployed in the region, sporadic attacks by the Ansar Allah continued. The group only announced an end to its attacks on non-Israeli ships following the agreement of a ceasefire in Gaza.

Should conflict erupt either in Gaza or Yemen, it is highly likely that the Ansar Allah will target the Red Sea shipping lanes once again. Although airstrikes by Israel and the U.S. have degraded some Ansar Allah capabilities, the group has nevertheless proven itself resilient and has been able to inflict outsized damage on its enemies. As such, many shipping companies will likely err on the side of caution, and avoid the Red Sea until hostilities are resolved, resulting in renewed supply line troubles for Europe in particular.

Two regional countries stand to suffer the most from Ansar Allah attacks in the event of resumed hostilities: Israel and Saudi Arabia. Both countries were already targeted by Ansar Allah attacks owing to the conflict in Gaza and their support for the Yemeni IRG respectively. The Ansar Allah are extremely likely to conduct similar attacks, should hostilities with either country escalate once again.

For Israel, these attacks represent a limited risk: The country’s air defense systems were successful in shooting down Ansar Allah drones and missiles. However, the Red Sea attacks nevertheless left the Israeli port at Eliat nearly inactive and resulted in the highest levels of consumer price index in Israel since October 2023. Despite these factors, due to lower reliance on maritime imports and early rerouting of shipping, the country did not suffer significantly. Although the Ansar Allah have vowed to attack Israel in the event of the Gaza ceasefire failing, it is unlikely they will inflict any more damage than they already have. Instead, such attacks are likely to invite Israeli retaliation on Yemeni ports such as Hodeida, resulting in further strains on Yemen’s domestic economic and humanitarian conditions.

The risks are far greater for Saudi Arabia, which already suffered Ansar Allah drone attacks targeting Aramco facilities in 2021. Ansar Allah drones also struck oil refineries as far as Jeddah, highlighting the group’s capabilities. These attacks often result in price shocks, with the 2021 attack resulting in oil prices rising by more than $70 per barrel. The fact that Saudi Arabia managed to recover production and absorb the costs of the attacks means renewed attacks following similar patterns are unlikely to cause severe long-term impacts. However, failure to stem sustained attacks, and resulting price shocks, are likely to erode both the country’s economy and the global economy, while also damaging confidence in the country’s ability to manage the conflict.

Outlook

In the coming months, Yemen is likely to experience renewed instability and potential conflict. While there are some positive signs for the future—such as the longevity of the ceasefire beyond its expiration, ongoing backchannel talks between Ansar Allah and the SLC, and the resilience of the Saudi-Iran détente—these trends may be overshadowed by unfavorable international developments. Specifically, Washington’s resumption of its ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Iran and Israel’s increased targeting of Iranian allies and assets across the Middle East could exacerbate tensions. 

Domestically, rising tensions around Marib, coupled with worsening economic and humanitarian conditions, suggest that the current period of calm is reaching an unsustainable point. Whether through conflict or sanctions, the erosion of even one of Yemen’s fragile pillars of stability is likely to lead to significant upheaval and instability.

In the event of a conflict, the regions around Marib and Hodeida are likely to emerge as the most significant flashpoints. With Hodeida home to Yemen’s main port and farmlands, and Marib housing large numbers of displaced Yemenis as well as some of the country’s main oil fields, instability in either region will cause significant pressure on the agricultural and hydrocarbon sectors that the already-tattered Yemeni economy relies on. Such a crisis is also likely to result in fresh moves of displaced Yemenis to more stable parts of the country, putting further pressure on the infrastructure and economy there.

Internationally, the renewed fighting is unlikely to have major impacts on Ansar Allah’s main adversaries: Saudi Arabia and Israel. Both countries have shown themselves to be capable of defending themselves against attacks, and recovering from any damage caused. Instead, the greatest losers of renewed conflict in Yemen will be outside parties reliant on the Red Sea shipping lanes, which are anticipated to be attacked by Ansar Allah once again. Jordan, Egypt, and European countries are likely to be the most significant losers in such a scenario.

The Iranian dimension remains to be seen: geopolitically, the country is on a severe back foot following the degradation of Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the loss of Syria. Economically, the country is dealing with a severe economic crisis. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to predict if Tehran will de-escalate in a bid to bide its strength or escalate to prevent the defeat of Ansar Allah, who has proven to be both capable and resilient.

There is a likelihood that Ansar Allah can be pushed back through a combination of U.S., U.K. and Israeli air power and SLC ground troops. However, such coordination will be dependent on numerous geopolitical factors that may or may not materialize. Furthermore, there is the unresolved issue of how the IRG will regain and sustain legitimacy after spending nearly a decade in de facto exile. The UAE, through the STC, may emerge as a kingmaker in this scenario. However, aligning the STC with the IRG will be a challenge. As a result, there is a small likelihood that the country may remain divided even after a victory against Ansar Allah.

Entities operating in Yemen should prepare for renewed instability and conflict in the near future, as various political and economic factors are contributing to escalating tensions. Continued unrest could disrupt operations and pose significant risks to both personnel and assets in the region.

Recommendations

Travel & Security Measures:

• Always travel with armed guards, especially in high-risk areas.
• Avoid unnecessary movement and use low-profile travel methods where possible.
• Establish safe meeting locations and pre-approved routes for staff mobility.

Staff Safety & Protection:

• Provide staff with up-to-date risk assessments on frontline developments and conflict zones.
• Provide staff operating in high-risk regions such as Hodeida and Marib with evacuation plans. 
• Stay updated on Ansar Allah’s enforcement of the Mahram policy to anticipate operational disruptions.
• Monitor and document detentions of aid workers to anticipate which areas can pose a risk.
• Maintain discretion in public statements to avoid political complications.
• Train staff on dealing with harassment and checkpoint restrictions.

Engagement with Authorities & Local Actors:

• Establish direct communication channels with local authorities to track security developments.
• Strengthen relationships with local authorities to facilitate movement and approvals.
• Coordinate with influential tribal and community leaders to ensure local acceptance.
• Partner with trusted local organizations to navigate bureaucratic and security challenges.

Operational Contingency Planning:

• Develop emergency response protocols for staff in case of detentions or security incidents.
• Maintain alternative supply routes and logistical solutions to mitigate disruptions.
• Prepare for potential suspensions of operations and ensure rapid resumption plans.

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