Myanmar Earthquake Disaster Response: Situation Report

Executive Summary

On March 28, 2025, at 12:50:52 MMT (06:20:52 UTC), a powerful 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck central Myanmar, with its epicenter near Mandalay. This natural disaster has resulted in over 1,600 confirmed fatalities, extensive infrastructure damage, and thousands of displaced persons. The earthquake has significantly compounded Myanmar's pre-existing humanitarian crisis, which has been ongoing since the military coup in February 2021.

This report provides a comprehensive overview of the current safety and security situation for humanitarian organizations responding to the disaster. It outlines affected regions, key statistics, access challenges within the current political context, notable security incidents, and evolving stability factors that impact operational risks for disaster relief organizations.

The military junta has made a rare plea for international assistance and announced a temporary ceasefire until April 22, 2025, which presents both opportunities and challenges for humanitarian organizations. While this may facilitate some access to affected areas, significant obstacles remain, including damaged infrastructure, ongoing conflicts in certain regions, and the junta's control over aid distribution.

This report aims to equip humanitarian organizations with critical information to navigate the complex operational environment and deliver effective assistance to affected populations while maintaining staff safety and security.

2. AFFECTED REGIONS AND LOCATIONS

2.1 Primary Impact Zones

Sagaing Region:

• Epicenter located approximately 17km from Sagaing city
• Severe damage reported in Sagaing, Monywa, and surrounding rural townships
• Multiple villages entirely flattened with 70-90% structural damage
• Significant damage to transportation infrastructure including bridges and roads
• Rural communities in western and northern districts largely cut off from assistance

Mandalay Region:

• Extensive damage in Mandalay city, Myanmar's second-largest urban center
• Historic temples and pagodas severely damaged, including parts of the ancient city
• Multiple high-rise buildings collapsed in downtown areas
• Informal settlements on city outskirts particularly affected with near-total destruction
• Amarapura and Innwa townships reporting severe damage to residential structures

Magway Region:

• Moderate to severe damage in northern districts
• Several landslides reported along hillside communities
• Critical infrastructure including hospitals and water systems compromised

Nay Pyi Taw Union Territory:

• Limited structural damage to government buildings
• Surrounding townships reporting moderate damage to residential structures
• Communication infrastructure partially compromised

2.2 Secondary Impact Zones

Shan State (Southern):

• Moderate damage reported in townships bordering the Mandalay Region
• Limited access due to ongoing conflicts between ethnic armed organizations and military forces
• Displacement from conflict areas compounded by earthquake displacement

Bago Region:

• Minor to moderate damage reported
• Serving as a transit point for relief supplies heading to more severely affected areas

Yangon Region:

• Limited physical damage but serving as the primary logistics hub for international aid
• Airport operational but experiencing congestion due to incoming relief flights

3. KEY STATISTICS

3.1 Casualties and Injuries

• Confirmed fatalities: 1,672 (as of April 2, 2025)
• Injured: Approximately 4,800
• Missing persons: Estimated 1,200
• Highest concentration of casualties: Sagaing (42%), Mandalay (38%), Magway (12%), Other regions (8%)

3.2 Displacement and Shelter Needs

• Total displaced population: Approximately 210,000
• People in temporary shelters: 105,000
• People in informal settlements: 65,000
• People staying with host families: 40,000
• Shelter needs: Estimated 45,000 emergency shelter units required

3.3 Infrastructure Impact

• Buildings completely destroyed: 22,400
• Buildings with significant structural damage: 38,600
• Healthcare facilities damaged/destroyed: 42
• Schools damaged/destroyed: 186
• Bridges compromised or collapsed: 28
• Roads severely damaged (km): 340
• Water systems affected: 64% of systems in primary impact zones non-functional

3.4 Humanitarian Response Capacity

• UN agencies present: 8
• International NGOs with operational presence: 24
• Local civil society organizations active in response: 56
• Current funding gap: 78% of estimated needs remain unfunded

4. ACCESS ISSUES FOR RESPONDING ORGANIZATIONS

4.1 Political Context Constraints

Military Junta Control:

• The State Administration Council (SAC) maintains strict control over humanitarian access
• All international aid must be channeled through military-approved mechanisms
• Temporary ceasefire announced until April 22, 2025, but implementation remains inconsistent
• Military checkpoints have increased throughout affected regions, particularly on major routes to Sagaing

Parallel Governance Structures:

• National Unity Government (NUG) maintains influence in parts of affected regions
• People's Defense Forces (PDFs) control certain rural areas, particularly in Sagaing
• Dual permission systems often required for accessing communities under contested control
• Organizations perceived as working exclusively with military authorities face security risks from opposition forces

Administrative Barriers:

• Complex and time-consuming approval processes for travel authorizations
• Frequent changes to bureaucratic requirements without notice
• Mandatory military escorts in certain areas, compromising humanitarian principles
• Restrictions on communication equipment and satellite phones for humanitarian workers

4.2 Physical Access Challenges

Infrastructure Damage:

• Major highway connecting Yangon to Mandalay partially operational with significant delays
• Road access to western Sagaing region largely cut off due to bridge collapses
• Secondary and tertiary roads in rural areas extensively damaged
• Landslides blocking access to multiple mountain communities in northern regions
• Mandalay airport operating at limited capacity; Sagaing airfields unusable

Logistical Constraints:

• Fuel shortages affecting transportation capacity
• Limited warehousing facilities in affected areas
• Banking system disruptions hampering cash-based operations
• Telecommunications outages in approximately 40% of affected areas
• Electricity supply unreliable or absent in most affected locations

4.3 Security-Related Access Impediments

Active Conflict Zones:

• Ongoing skirmishes despite ceasefire in parts of Sagaing and Shan State
• Unexploded ordnance (UXO) risks in areas of recent conflict
• Ambushes reported on roads connecting Mandalay to northern townships
• Increased military presence in previously contested areas using earthquake as pretext

Civil Unrest:

• Protests against perceived inequitable aid distribution in several locations
• Looting incidents reported at damaged warehouses and commercial centers
• Growing tensions between displaced communities and host populations
• Roadblocks established by local communities to control movement and aid distribution

5. NOTABLE SECURITY INCIDENTS

5.1 Recent Incidents Affecting Humanitarian Operations

March 29, 2025:

• Military checkpoint denied access to international medical team attempting to reach Sagaing
• Convoy of food supplies diverted by authorities in Mandalay for "verification"
• Two local staff of international NGO briefly detained while conducting needs assessment

March 30, 2025:

• Helicopter carrying assessment team forced to return due to reported anti-aircraft fire
• Warehouse in Monywa township looted, with loss of pre-positioned relief supplies
• Armed group intercepted and seized medical supplies on route to northern Sagaing

March 31, 2025:

• Improvised explosive device (IED) detonated on road between Mandalay and Sagaing, no casualties
• Relief distribution point in eastern Mandalay disrupted by crowd control issues
• Military commandeered NGO vehicles for "official earthquake response" in two instances

April 1-2, 2025:

• Three separate incidents of aid convoys being stopped and "taxed" by non-state armed groups
• Temporary detention of assessment team by military forces for "unauthorized drone usage"
• Civil unrest at distribution site resulting in temporary suspension of activities
• Targeted cyber attacks reported against humanitarian organizations' communications systems

5.2 Patterns of Security Concerns

Targeting of Relief Assets:

• Increasing incidents of relief supply diversion and commandeering
• Strategic checkpoints established to control humanitarian movements
• Attempts to influence beneficiary selection and distribution mechanisms
• Reports of forced branding of aid with military insignia before distribution

Staff Safety Issues:

• Heightened risk of arbitrary detention, particularly for local staff
• Increased questioning and surveillance of humanitarian workers
• Threats against organizations perceived as favoring certain communities
• Restricted movement after military-imposed curfews (8:00 PM to 5:00 AM)

Civilian Protection Concerns:

• Continued airstrikes reported in northwestern Sagaing despite ceasefire
• Forced relocation of earthquake-affected communities in contested areas
• Gender-based violence incidents increasing in overcrowded displacement sites
• Ethnic and religious minorities reporting discriminatory treatment in aid distribution

6. KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESPONDING ORGANIZATIONS

6.1 Operational Approach Recommendations

Coordination Mechanisms:

• Utilize the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) structure for coordinated negotiation with authorities
• Engage with both formal and informal coordination structures to maximize access
• Maintain clear separation between humanitarian and political activities
• Consider area-based coordination approaches in regions with multiple access challenges

Access Negotiations:

• Develop specific negotiation strategies for different controlling entities
• Prepare for multiple layers of approvals and frequent changes in requirements
• Document all agreements in writing where possible
• Utilize local networks and community leaders as intermediaries when appropriate

Programming Adaptations:

• Design flexible implementation modalities adaptable to changing access conditions
• Prepare remote management protocols for areas with limited physical access
• Develop partnerships with local organizations having established access
• Consider cash-based interventions where markets are functional

6.2 Risk Mitigation Strategies

Staff Safety Protocols:

• Implement strict movement tracking and approval systems
• Establish clear communication protocols including regular check-ins
• Conduct comprehensive security briefings for all staff, including scenario planning
• Develop hibernation, relocation, and evacuation plans specific to each operational area

Asset Protection Measures:

• Maintain low visibility for warehouses and stockpiles where possible
• Implement strict convoy management procedures
• Establish clear protocols for interactions at checkpoints
• Consider multiple smaller shipments rather than large, highly visible convoys

Information Security:

• Enforce strict data protection protocols for beneficiary information
• Implement secure communications systems resistant to monitoring
• Limit sharing of movement plans to essential personnel only
• Regularly update digital security measures to prevent cyber threats

6.3 Humanitarian Principles Application

Neutrality Preservation:

• Maintain transparent communication with all parties to the conflict
• Resist pressure to align with any political or military agenda
• Ensure aid distribution based solely on needs assessment
• Clearly communicate humanitarian principles to all stakeholders

Do No Harm Considerations:

• Conduct regular conflict sensitivity analyses
• Assess potential security implications for communities receiving assistance
• Monitor for aid diversion or manipulation that could fuel conflict
• Consider protection implications of all programming decisions

7. EVOLVING STABILITY FACTORS

7.1 Improving Conditions

Humanitarian Access:

• Military's temporary ceasefire announcement until April 22, 2025
• Simplified customs clearance procedures for relief items at Yangon airport
• Increased issuance of travel authorizations for humanitarian personnel
• Some roadblocks and checkpoints removed on main supply routes to Mandalay

Coordination Mechanisms:

• Establishment of joint coordination center in Mandalay with multiple stakeholders
• Increased information sharing among humanitarian organizations
• Growing acceptance of cluster coordination approach by authorities
• Improved civil-military coordination for specific life-saving activities

Community Resilience:

• Strong local response capacity through community-based organizations
• Effective self-organization in many affected communities
• Private sector engagement in relief efforts increasing
• Diaspora support channeling resources through local networks

7.2 Degrading Conditions

Political Dynamics:

• Increasing instrumentalization of aid for political legitimacy
• Growing tensions between military and ethnic armed organizations
• Signs of ceasefire violations in northwestern Sagaing Region
• Hardening positions on humanitarian access in contested areas

Operational Environment:

• Worsening fuel shortages affecting logistics capacity
• Increased bureaucratic impediments for needs assessments
• Growing pressure to share beneficiary data with authorities
• Inflation and currency volatility affecting program budgets

Secondary Risks:

• Monsoon season approaching (expected by late April)
• Public health concerns with water contamination and disease outbreaks
• Population movements from rural to urban areas straining resources
• Growing tensions between host communities and displaced populations

7.3 Key Indicators to Monitor

Security Indicators:

• Frequency and location of ceasefire violations
• Checkpoint behavior and restrictions on movement
• Incidents targeting humanitarian actors or assets
• Civil unrest related to aid distribution

Political Indicators:

• Changes in rhetoric from military authorities regarding international assistance
• Positioning of National Unity Government on humanitarian response
• Regional countries' diplomatic engagement with Myanmar authorities
• UN Security Council discussions on humanitarian access

Operational Indicators:

• Processing time for travel authorizations and permits
• Restrictions on assessment activities and information gathering
• Interference in beneficiary selection or distribution methodologies
• Ability to import and transport relief supplies

8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The March 28, 2025 earthquake has created a challenging humanitarian emergency in Myanmar, compounding an already complex crisis. The temporary ceasefire and the military's request for international assistance present a narrow window of opportunity for humanitarian organizations to scale up their response, but significant challenges remain.

Organizations planning to engage in the response should:

• Prioritize staff safety through comprehensive security management systems and regular situation monitoring
• Invest in access negotiations at multiple levels, recognizing the complex governance landscape
• Strengthen coordination with other humanitarian actors to present a unified approach
• Maintain principled humanitarian action despite pressures to compromise
• Develop flexible programming approaches adaptable to rapidly changing conditions
• Establish strong community engagement mechanisms to build acceptance and understand evolving needs
• Prepare for prolonged response as earthquake recovery will likely extend well beyond the temporary ceasefire period

The humanitarian community must balance the urgent imperative to assist earthquake-affected populations with the complex realities of operating in Myanmar's challenging political and security environment. By adopting conflict-sensitive approaches and maintaining strict adherence to humanitarian principles, organizations can maximize their effectiveness while minimizing risks to staff and affected communities.

Information Resources

Risk managers are advised to utilize the below resources for access to updated damage assessments, passable travel routes and other essential planning and operational insights.

Further reporting and analysis resources of a bespoke, mission focused nature remain available to Riley Risk clients:

Map Information

• Map Action Repository
• LogCluster Maps/Info
• Unitar: Exposed Population/Intensity Zones

Reporting & Insights

• COAR Rapid Assessment report
• ReliefWeb: Myanmar Reports
• MIMU Resources